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INTRODUCTION

In the collective bargaining context, contractual provisions
requiring "just cause" for dismissal' have long imposed upon
employers a duty to investigate before discharging an employee.2
Although nonunion employers also occasionally agree to terminate
only for cause,3 they ordinarily do not.4 Absent such an agree-

1. "Just cause" is "acommon standard for termination in collective bargaining
agreements." Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Independent Oil & Chem. Workers,
386 F. Supp. 213, 223 (D. Md. 1974); see also Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911
F.2d 191, 196 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (stating that provisions
requiring just cause for termination have been "used in most collective bargaining
agreements throughout the nation for the past fifty-odd years"), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 917 (1991); Locke v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 660 F.2d 359, 367 (8th
Cir. 1981) (referring to the "'just cause' clause in a typical collective bargaining
agreement"); Show Indus., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 447, 455 (1993) (characterizing the
"just cause standard for disciplinary actions" as one of the "bulwark[s] of job
security provisions in a typical collective bargaining agreement").
2. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8129
(1987) (Collins, Arb.); Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
555 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.); see also Howard P. Foley Co. v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 789 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (Norris, J., dissenting)
(observing that "in a number of unreported decisions arbitrators have interpreted
... 'just cause' provisions as imposing a duty on employers to investigate"); see
generally Dow Chem. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 703,706-07 (1973) (Gentile,
Arb.):
"Just cause" is a multi-faceted consideration which has been applied by
Arbitrators to fact portraits in various ways. A thread which runs
through these numerous decisions is the concept that the Company make
a full, fair and objective investigation in order to be satisfied that the
charged individual is in fact guilty of the offense or breach.
3. See Sanders, 911 F.2d at 196 n.2 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); see also
Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1411 (1967)
("Aside from the protection offered by limitations on the right of discharge
reached by collective bargaining, just cause limitations . . . are found in
individually negotiated contracts of employment for a specified term."); see
generally David M. Young, Note, The Ninth CircuitRequires Alaskan Employers
to Prove Misconduct to Justify Termination of Employees in Hazardous Workplaces: Sanders v. Parker Drilling, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 201, 204 n.21
(1991) ("The parties can create a just cause contract by explicit agreement or by
an implied contract based either on oral statements or written statements
contained in employee handbooks which would lead employees to believe they had
job security.").
4. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21, 28 (Mass. 1981)
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ment, the law generally has not imposed upon employers an

obligation to investigate an employee's conduct or performance
before exercising the right to discharge.5

Courts ordinarily have concluded that the recognition of a
common law, extra-contractual duty to investigate before discharging would be inconsistent with the "employment at-will" rule,6

which traditionally has permitted employers to discharge their
employees "at any time for any reason.",7 Recently, however, the

employment at-will rule has been the focus of extensive judicial and

("Collective bargaining agreements... generally permit discharge only for good
cause.... But other employment relationships... generally do not provide that
measure of job security."); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 470
(Md. 1981) (observing that "[most] American workers do not have the job security
provided by collective bargaining agreements"); Young, supra note 3, at 203
("Most private employment contracts outside of the collective bargaining context
contain[] little in job security protections for employees."); see generally Blades,
supra note 3, at 1411-12:
Only the unusually valuable employee has sufficient bargaining power to
obtain a guarantee that he will be discharged ...

only for "just cause."

... [O]nly a very small portion of the non-unionized employees in this
country have succeeded in so altering the presumptively at[-]will nature
of the employment relationship.
5. See Ferrett v. General Motors Corp., 475 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Mich. 1991)
("There is... no right arising at common law .... separate and distinct from any
contractual right, to be evaluated ... before being discharged from employment.");
cf Wilson v. Vlasic Foods, Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2419, 2422 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(observing that employers "are under no legal duty to refrain from negligence in
discharging employees").
6. See, e.g., Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App.),
review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993); Hollars v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
792 P.2d 1146, 1156 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part), cert. quashed, 791 P.2d 465 (N.M. 1990); Alford v. Life Savers, Inc., 315
N.W.2d 260, 261 (Neb. 1982); Wilson, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422.
7. Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 786 (Alaska 1989).
"The classic statement of the at-will rule is that an employer may discharge an
employee 'for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without
being thereby guilty of legal wrong."' Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407
N.W.2d 206,211 (N.D. 1987) (quoting Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn.
507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134
(Tenn. 1915)); see generally Penny L. Crook, Employment at Will: The "American
Rule" and Its Application in Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 23, 23 (1985) ("American
courts have adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward employment contracts, favoring
a presumption that contracts of indeterminate length are terminable at will.").
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academic criticism,' and the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized
a number of exceptions to it.9
An exception exists, for example, when the terms of an

employee handbook or other representations give rise to an implied
contract limiting the employer's right to discharge."0 Alaska also

recognizes a public policy exception allowing at-will employees to
recover when they have been discharged in violation of a public
policy that "strike[s] at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties,
and responsibilities .

.

. ."" Finally, Alaska prohibits employers

from discharging their employees in violation of a covenant of good
12
faith and fair dealing implicit in the employment relationship.
The occasional recognition in other jurisdictions of claims for
negligent discharge may reflect yet another emerging exception to
the employment at-will rule. 3 Indeed, the continuing assault on

8. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Ross Hyden Motors, Inc., 722 P.2d 1192, 1195 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1986) (referring to the "mounting criticism by scholars and courts
directed at the rule's harshness"); Thomas P. Owens III, Note, Employment at Will
in Alaska: The Question of Public Policy Torts, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 269, 276
(1989) (discussing the "torrent of academic criticism decrying the . . .rule as

antiquated, unfair and philosophically pass6").
9. See Jones, 779 P.2d at 786 (citing the "'strong trend in favor of recognizing
implied contract terms that modify the power of an employer to discharge an
employee [without cause].' (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,
384 (Cal. 1988))); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1128
(Alaska 1989) (referring with apparent approval to the "emerging mixture of
theories known as the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine of employment law"); see generally Joyce S. Rutledge, Monitoringthe Employment Contract
in Alaska, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 265,266 (1989) ("[S]ince the early 1980s the Alaska
Supreme Court has demonstrated a solid familiarity with all the intriguing modem
judicial approaches to the interpretation of the at-will employment relationship.");
Crook, supra note 7, at 23 ("Alaska, while it has not explicitly repudiated the atwill doctrine, has taken major strides toward reforming the law of employment
contracts.").
10. Jones,779 P.2d at 785-87; Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group,
Inc., 663 P.2d 958, 959 (Alaska 1983).
11. Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981)); see also Knight v. American Guard &
Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska 1986) (referring to the public policy
exception with apparent approval). But see Owens, supra note 8, at 270 (observing
that "the Alaska Supreme Court is unlikely to recognize the public policy doctrine
as a significant limitation on employer discretion").
12. Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1131.
13. See, e.g., Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 772 P.2d 288, 291 (Mont. 1989).
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the rule 14 suggests that it ultimately may be abandoned altogether"5 in favor of the recognition of a "new duty of due care owed
by an employer . . . rendering [it] liable for damages for the

negligent breach of [that] duty."16 One component of such a tortbased duty undoubtedly would be a requirement that employers
"investigate allegations with due care before discharging an
employee."'"
The possibility of such a requirement has significant implications." The erosion of the employment at-will doctrine already
has substantially increased the amount of employment litigation, 9
The
and the phenomenon "has not left Alaska unaffected."'

14. See, e.g., Boudar v. E.G. & G., Inc. 742 P.2d 491, 494 (N.M. 1987) ("The

terminable-at-will rule is undergoing considerable erosion in the various states,
whether by legislative fiat or judicial reconsideration."); Crook, supra note 7, at

23 (observing that "the courts and legislatures of many states have created
exceptions to the . . .rule"); Young, supra note 3, at 204 ("The trend in the
United States courts over the past several decades has been to move away from
the presumption of employment at-will, and to provide greater job security for
employees.").
15. See Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Dismissal from Employment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1 (1979) (predicting that "American courts
will abandon the principle that.., a contract of employment for an indefinite
term is... terminable at will by either party").
16. Gossage v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc. 698 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D. Ind.

1988).
17. Hollars v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 792 P.2d 1146, 1156 (N.M. Ct. App.
1989) (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. quashed,791 P.2d 465
(N.M. 1990).

18. See Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App.)
(discussing the policy implications of recognizing a tort claim for negligent
investigation in the employment context), review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash.
1993).
19. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the
FirstAmendment as Public Policy for Wrongful DischargeActions, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 341, 372 (1994) ("There is already ample concern that the wrongful discharge
tort has vastly increased potential employer liability.").
20. Rutledge, supra note 9, at 265. In a case applying Alaska law, Judge
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit decried the increase in employment litigation on the
following basis:
Judicial proceedings ... are expensive and protracted, with litigation
costs amounting to 80% of the average total recovery in settled cases and
130% in cases that go to trial.... They require the courts to secondguess management decisions made years earlier... [and] largely ignore
the legitimate interests of others, including those of fellow workers who
may be affected by the decision.
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recognition of a duty to investigate before discharging undoubtedly
would have a similar impact.21 Indeed, one judge observed that
the recognition of a duty to investigate would create an atmosphere

in which "[a]lmost any dispute with a factual component.., could
end up in court."' Because an increased potential for jury review
of personnel decisions may deprive employers of the flexibility
necessary to run their businesses,' another judge has character24
ized that possibility as an "immensely troubling prospect.,
Given these views, relatively few courts have been willing to
recognize a claim for "negligent investigation" in the employment
context.' In Walt v. State,26 the Alaska Supreme Court joined
those courts that have refused to impose upon employers an extracontractual duty to investigate before discharging.2 7 However,

Alaska's recognition of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and the court's interpretation of that covenant in cases

Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 212 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (citing Note, Employer Opportunismand the Need for a Just Cause
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510, 525-528 & nn.70-71 (1989)), cert. denied, 500

U.S. 917 (1991).
21. See Wilson v. Vlasic Foods, Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2419, 2422 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) ("Recognizing a duty of care in this situation would turn nearly every
termination into a potential tort suit and would circumvent the policy.., which
authorizes most employment contracts to be terminated at will."); see generally
Owens, supra note 8, at 306 (referring to the "significant increase in [employment]
litigation that inevitably accompanies the broadening of recovery theories").
22. Hollars v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 792 P.2d 1146, 1156 (N.M. Ct. App.
1989) (Hartz, I., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. quashed,791 P.2d 465
(N.M. 1990). The significance of this observation becomes apparent when one
considers that "conflicting stories can be found in virtually every [case] where the
propriety of an employee's discharge is at issue." Blades, supra note 3, at 1428.
23. See Heltborg v. Modern Mach., 795 P.2d 954,961 (Mont. 1990) (noting that
"plac[ing] the jury in the middle of general management decisions.., in effect
eviscerat[es] the concept of employer latitude in decision-making"). But cf. Waters
v. Churchill, 114 S.Ct. 1878,1889 (1994) ("[E]mployer decisionmaking [would] not
be unduly burdened by having courts look to the facts as the employer reasonably
found them to be.").
24. Sanders, 911 F.2d at 211 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
25. See Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Wash. Ct. App.),
review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993); Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum
Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
26. 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988).
27. Id at 1351.
28. See ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Alaska 1988);
Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006-07 (Alaska 1983).
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decided subsequent to Wal 2 9 suggest that whether employers

generally have a duty to investigate before discharging is still an
open issue in Alaska.3
This article begins with a review of cases from other jurisdictions that appear to impose upon employers a duty to investigate
before discharging.

It then discusses Alaska's treatment of the

issue and notes that while the Alaska Supreme Court has refused
to recognize a tort-based duty to investigate in the employment
context, 32 its interpretation of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing may impose a contractual duty to investigate on all
employers.3 3 Finally, the article considers the ramifications of that

possibility 34 and concludes that the imposition of any duty to
investigate should be the result of legislative enactment rather than
judicial decision.
II. THE VIEW THAT EMPLOYERS HAVE A COMMON LAW
DUTY TO INVESTIGATE BEFORE DISCHARGING
A common law duty to investigate prior to discharging an
employee has received only mixed support in a number of states.
Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc.,35 often is described as the "seminal"
case recognizing a duty on the part of employers to use due care in
discharging their employees.3 6 In Chamberlain, the plaintiff
received an annual performance evaluation approximately three
months before being discharged.37 Applying Michigan law,3" the

29. See infra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 215 n.16 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (observing in a case arising under Alaska law that
the good faith obligation "requires the employer to conduct a reasonable
investigation of the alleged [rule] violation" before discharging an employee), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 917 (1991).
31. See generally Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Wash. Ct.
App.) (collecting cases), review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993).
32. See Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Alaska 1988).
33. See Sanders, 911 F.2d at 215 n.16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
34. See generally Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1119 (concluding that the imposition of
a general duty to investigate before discharging would be inappropriate "[a]s a
matter of policy").
35. 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
36. See, e.g., 1 HENRY H. PERRIT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND
PRACrICE § 5.48, at 572 (3d ed. 1992).
37. Chamberlain,547 F. Supp. at 1071-72.
38. The Chamberlain court relied upon Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 302
N.W.2d 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), observing that the Michigan Court of Appeals
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court held that the employer was negligent in failing to inform the
plaintiff at the time of the evaluation that he faced possible
termination unless his performance improved.3 9 It concluded that
an employer that undertakes to conduct performance reviews has
a duty to use reasonable care in doing so.4"
Although indicating that a complete failure to evaluate the
plaintiff might have been actionable "only as a breach of contract,"
the court nevertheless concluded that the negligent performance of
the plaintiff's evaluation was actionable in tort.41 In reaching that
conclusion, the court observed that "[t]he fact that no actionable
breach of contract may have occurred does not preclude a finding
that the performance of [the] contractual undertaking has been
negligent," because a contractual duty to evaluate an employee's
performance is distinct from the duty to use ordinary care in
conducting the evaluation.42

recognized a cause of action for "negligent job evaluation" in that case.
Chamberlain, 547 F. Supp. at 1081. In Kostello v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 472
N.W.2d 71,73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), however, the Court of Appeals subsequently
described Schipani as the "only Michigan [case] to recognize a negligent evaluation
claim in the context of an employment contract" and stated that "[s]ince its
release, Schipani has been routinely rejected by other panels of [the Michigan]
Court [of Appeals]."
39. Chamberlain, 547 F. Supp. at 1080-81. Cf. Treadwell v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 278, 288 (D. Mass. 1987), where the plaintiff
argued that the employer had "negligently performed [its annual performance]
evaluations by failing to warn at the last evaluation ... that [the] plaintiff was in
jeopardy of being terminated," thereby "lull[ing] [him] into a false sense of job
security . .. ."
40. Chamberlain, 547 F. Supp. at 1081-82; see also Tohline v. Central Trust
Co., 549 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (assuming that an employer that
"volunteered to conduct a thorough investigation prior to terminating" an
employee "must perform the duty with ordinary care"), appeal dismissed, 534
N.E.2d 1202 (Ohio 1989). But see Prost v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 647 F. Supp. 946,
947 (D. Kan. 1985) (describing the contention that "once [an] employer undertakes
to perform evaluations, [it] must do so in a non-negligent manner" as "contrary
to the employment-at-will doctrine").
41. Chamberlain,547 F. Supp. at 1081.
42. Id.; cf. Ferrett v. General Motors Corp., 475 N.W.2d 243, 248 n.12 (Mich.
1991) ("Cases rejecting a tort of negligent evaluation generally draw no distinction
between a failure to evaluate and negligence in the evaluation.").
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The holding in Chamberlain has been criticized 43 and has

been undermined by subsequent Michigan cases "declin[ing] to
impose upon employers an extra-contractual duty in applying
policies and procedures."' In particular, the conclusion that an
employer who undertakes to evaluate an employee may be liable

for failing to use reasonable care in doing so seems likely to
prompt at least
some employers to refrain from evaluating their
45
employees.

Despite its questionable vitality, Chamberlaincontinues to be
cited for the proposition that Michigan recognizes a claim for
negligent evaluation in the employment context.46 Moreover, the
Chamberlain court's reasoning appears to be consistent with the

prevailing view on general private-entity tort liability in Alaska.47
This suggests that Alaska may join those courts that impose upon

43. See, e.g., Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App.),
review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993); Gossage v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc.,
698 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
44. Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1119 (citing Struble v. Lacks Indus., Inc., 403 N.W.2d
71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)(per curiam)); see also Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124
F.R.D. 610, 611 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (referring to "a claim for negligent discharge
...based on the now-discredited theory of Chamberlain");see generally Ferrett
v. General Motors Corp., 475 N.W.2d 243, 246 n.4 (Mich. 1991).
45. The New Mexico Supreme Court recently made a similar point in
Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776 (N.M. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
1068 (1994). The plaintiff argued that the employer should be required to
establish just cause for his termination because one of the employer's supervisor's
testified that "it was not [the employer's] custom and practice to go around firing
people and that when [it] did fire someone, [it] usually had a good reason." Id.
at 784-85. The court concluded that, "[a]s a matter of policy, [it would] not
consider evidence that a company does not usually fire employees without a good
reason as by itself establishing that the company does not maintain an at-will
employment policy" because "[t]o do otherwise would encourage employers to
occasionally fire employees for no other reason than to show that they maintain
the freedom to do so." Id. at 785 (emphasis deleted).
46. See, e.g., Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550,558 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (citing Chamberlainand Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 302 N.W.2d
307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)).
47. See City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Alaska 1985) ("The
basic question is whether the defendant has undertaken a responsibility. If it has,
and it has failed adequately to discharge that responsibility, it may be liable to
people who have been injured." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 323, 324A (1965))).
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employers a duty to exercise "ordinary and reasonable care in
investigating the need to terminate ... ."48
Montana, for example, recognized a claim for negligent
investigation in the employment context in Crenshaw v. Bozeman
Deaconess Hospital.49 In Crenshaw, the plaintiff was employed as

a hospital respiratory therapist." She was accused of misconduct
by three nurses working in the hospital's intensive care unit. 1
Among other things, the nurses claimed that the plaintiff breached
a duty of patient confidentiality, attempted to perform
medical tests
2
without authorization, and disrupted patient care.
Upon being notified of her discharge, the plaintiff met with the
hospital administrator, who indicated that he would review the
matter. 3 After the administrator interviewed various employees
present at the time of the alleged misconduct, he affirmed the
discharge. 4 The plaintiff then filed suit against the hospital, 55
claiming that the administrator was negligent in "fail[ing] to
interview all of the witnesses present on the night in question...
)756

The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the hospital's
conduct had fallen below the legal standard for protecting others
against unreasonable risks 57 and affirmed a jury verdict in favor
of the plaintiff on the negligence claim. 8 The court based its
conclusion on evidence that the hospital administrator had failed to

48. Heltborg v. Modern Mach., 795 P.2d 954, 959 (Mont. 1990) (declining to
impose a duty to investigate); see also Tollefson, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 558 (observing

that "a tort action for negligent performance of a contractual duty to evaluate..
has been recognized in... other jurisdictions").

49. 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984); see Heltborg,795 P.2d at 960 ("This Court first
allowed a negligence cause of action in an employment termination case in
Crenshaw.").
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Crenshaw, 693 P.2d at 488.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 490.

56. Id. at 493.
57. Id.; cf. Ashway v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 375,377
(D. Ariz. 1989) (concluding that tort law would support a duty to investigate
before discharging "if reasonable men would agree that [the employer] had an
obligation to use some care to avoid or prevent injury to [its employees]"), affd
in part,rev'd in part,945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992).
58. Crenshaw, 693 P.2d at 493.
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interview all of the relevant witnesses and on the conclusion of an
expert in personnel management that the allegations against the
plaintiff were not properly investigated before the discharge
decision was made.59 The court observed that the charges against
the plaintiff should not have been sustained without a "careful

consideration of the consequences to [her] professional livelihood
and reputation.

Thus, the court effectively held that a finding

of negligence is proper where an employer fails to investigate
61
allegations of misconduct before discharging an employee.
The conclusion in Crenshaw was endorsed in Flanigan v.
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,62 where the Montana
Supreme Court held that the contention that the plaintiff's former

employer failed to review her prior performance and work history
before discharging her would support a claim for negligence.63
Finding Crenshaw to be "compelling" precedent, the Flanigancourt
concluded that "[n]egligence [is] a proper basis for recovery in
wrongful termination cases. '
In Hollars v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,65 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals also concluded that there is a common
law duty to investigate before discharging. 66 The plaintiff in
59. Id.
60. Id. at 496; cf. Ashway, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 377 n.6
(recognizing a duty to investigate before discharging in part because false
accusations about an employee place "his job, his ability to earn a livelihood, and
his reputation

. . .

in jeopardy").

61. See Heltborg v. Modem Mach., 795 P.2d 954, 960 (Mont. 1990) (construing
Crenshaw). A similar concern led the court in Ashway to impose a duty to
investigate upon the employer in that case. See Ashway, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 3770 & n.7.
62. 720 P.2d 257 (Mont.), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 980 (1986).
63. Id. at 263.
64. Id.; see also Kizer v. Semitool, Inc., 824 P.2d 229, 236 (Mont. 1991)
(observing that "an employer may be liable for negligence.., for failing to make
a proper investigation before discharge"); Karell v. American Cancer Soc'y, 779
P.2d 506, 510 (Mont. 1989) ("Montana has recognized [a] cause of action for
negligent discharge from employment."). But see Kittelson v. Archie Cochrane
Motors, Inc., 813 P.2d 424, 426 (Mont. 1991) (observing that "negligent discharge
is no longer a recognized exception to termination of employment 'at will' in
Montana).
65. 792 P.2d 1146 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989), cert. quashed, 791 P.2d 465 (N.M.
1990).
66. See id. at 1156 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (observing
that New Mexico did not recognize a cause of action for negligent investigation in
the employment context "prior to this case").
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Hollars was discharged for allegedly being intoxicated while on
call.67 He appealed the dismissal under the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement and, as a result, was reinstated to his position
as an engineer.68
The plaintiff then filed suit, alleging that his employer had
been negligent in handling the investigation that led to his
discharge. 69 He claimed that the employer had a duty to investigate the charges against him before making the decision to
discharge and to disregard those charges if there was insufficient
evidence to support them.7" The trial court dismissed the claim,
holding that it was preempted by the Railway Labor Act (the
"RLA"),71 and the plaintiff appealed.7"
The New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that the
preemption issue was governed by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,73
a case arising under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act (the "LMRA"),74 rather than the RLA" Under that decision,7 6 the negligence claim in Hollars would be preempted if its
resolution required interpretation of the collective bargaining

67. Id. at 1148.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 1148, 1150.
70. Id. at 1150.
71. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). The RLA provides for "a comprehensive
conflict resolution procedure for railroad labor disputes." O'Brien v. Consolidated

Rail Corp., 972 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 980 (1993). Among
other things, the RLA "provides an arbitral forum for the resolution of 'disputes
between an employee ... and a carrier... growing out of grievances, or out of
the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions."' Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463, 465 (10th
Cir. 1992) (quoting 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (i) & 184), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2439
(1993). The preemption issue is a reflection of the view that "to permit litigation
in court of state law claims connected with [a] collective bargaining agreement
would undermine the purposes behind the RLA," which was "designed for quick

and efficient dispute resolution." O'Brien, 972 F.2d at 4.
72. Hollars, 792 P.2d at 1147-48.
73. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
75. Hollars, 792 P.2d at 1149-50.
76. The propriety of applying the Lingle test in a case arising under the RLA
is not in serious dispute. See, e.g., Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463,
466 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[Tjhe test articulated by Lingle ... is just as valid under the
RLA as it is under the LMRA."), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2439 (1993).
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agreement. 77 The court observed that interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement would be necessary, and the
plaintiff's negligence claim preempted, if the agreement "outline[d]
steps to be taken, or impose[d] a standard of care for investigations
and grievance procedures., 78 If the agreement was silent on those
matters, however, the court was of the view that the claim could
proceed under a general negligence standard.79 Because the
collective bargaining agreement was not part of the record on
appeal, and there was no indication that the trial court had applied
Lingle in ruling upon the preemption issue, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals remanded the case for a determination of whether
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was necessary.80
Judge Hartz dissented from the relevant portion of the court's
opinion." Judge Hartz agreed that the plaintiff's negligence claim
would be preempted if the collective bargaining agreement "deal[t]
with the employer's duty in investigating [the] alleged misconHe disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion
duct."
that the trial court could consider the claim under a general
negligence standard if the collective bargaining agreement did not
address the issue.8
Because New Mexico employers generally can discharge at
will," Judge Hartz concluded that they must have the right to
dismiss employees "on the basis of charges which [they] may not
have investigated adequately, unless [a] contract of employment
provides otherwise."85 Thus, if the collective bargaining agree77. Hollars,792 P.2d at 1150.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1148.
81. Id. at 1153 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 1156 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83. Id. (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
84. See, e.g., Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 635 P.2d 992, 997 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981) (referring to "New Mexico's long standing recognition of the 'at will'
rule"), disapproved on other grounds,Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, 869
P.2d 279 (N.M. 1994).
85. Hollars,792 P.2d at 1156 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
cf. Wilson v. Vlasic Foods, Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2419,2422 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
("The Court is aware of no authority... which holds that a party who is free to
terminate a relationship at will is nonetheless liable ... when the relationship is
terminated negligently."); Dowling v. Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., 338 So. 2d 88,
88-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the contention that appellants were

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:2

ment did not establish a duty to investigate, Judge Hartz believed
that the dismissal of the plaintiff's negligence claim should be
affirmed on the ground that "no non-contractual duty to investigate
allegations before discharging an employee has been recognized in
New Mexico," and "there can be no breach of a non-existent
duty."86 Because Judge Hartz's analysis was not embraced by the
Hollars majority, the court's conclusion appears to indicate that
employers in New Mexico may have a generalized, extra-contractual duty to "investigate allegations with due care before discharging
an employee."'
III.

ALASKA'S TREATMENT OF THE

DUTY TO INVESTIGATE

A. Alaska Does Not Recognize a Common Law, Tort-Based
Duty to Investigate Before Discharging
The Alaska Supreme Court's only specific consideration of
whether employers have a duty to investigate before discharging
occurred in Walt v. State." The plaintiff in Walt was employed as
a development specialist for the Alaska Department of Commerce
and Economic Development.89 In that position, he was subject to
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement." The plaintiff was
discharged as a result of his remarks at an economic development
conference that he attended on behalf of the department. 91
Promptly after being discharged, the plaintiff filed a grievance
in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.' The grievance was partially successful, and, as a result,

discharged for alleged improper conduct "without benefit of a reasonable
investigation which would have revealed that no such act had taken place" failed
to state a cause of action because the employer "had the legal right to terminate
appellants' employment at will"). But cf. Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 772 P.2d
288, 292 (Mont. 1989) ("If [an] at-will employer who can fire without cause...
chooses instead to fire an employee for [a stated reason], the discharged employee
must be given the opportunity to prove the charge ... false.").

86. Hollars,792 P.2d at 1156 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
87. Id. (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (characterizing the
majority's holding).
88. 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988).

89. Id. at 1346.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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the plaintiff was reinstated to his position.9' Shortly thereafter,
the plaintiff brought suit against the State of Alaska and several of
his supervisors, alleging, among other things, that the defendants
had breached a duty to use reasonable care in determining whether
there was cause for his termination.94
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, finding that the grievance procedure provided for in the
collective bargaining agreement constituted the plaintiff's "exclusive
method of recourse," and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the
Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred in
holding that the plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement because the State had
"stipulated that [the plaintiff's] tort claims were not arbitrable."9
That ruling, in turn, necessitated a determination of whether the
plaintiff's negligence claim was substantively viable "apart from the
remedies . . . afforded [under] the collective bargaining agreement." 97 The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the claim

was not substantively viable, affirming the trial court's dismissal of
the plaintiff's negligence claim on the ground that Alaska does not
recognize a common law tort for negligent investigation in the
employment context. 98
B. Contract Provisions Limiting the Right to Discharge May Give
Rise to a Duty to Investigate
Although it concluded that there is no tort-based duty to
investigate before discharging, the Walt court indicated that the
State's alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in investigating
whether grounds existed for the plaintiff's termination might have
provided the basis for a viable breach of contract claim. 99 This

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1346-47.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id. at 1350-51.
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1351, 1354 n.18.
Id. at 1351. More specifically, the court characterized the plaintiff's

allegation that the State had been negligent in investigating the basis for his
termination as "an attempt to change a claim for breach of contract into a tort

claim." Id. (emphasis added). Had the plaintiff asserted a claim for breach of
contract premised upon the State's allegedly inadequate investigation, however, the
claim presumably would have been subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff's
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suggestion apparently was premised upon the existence of a
provision in the applicable collective bargaining agreement
requiring just cause for dismissal." °
Elsewhere, the Alaska Supreme Court has indicated that
although there is no uniform right to just cause for termination,
employers who agree to terminate only for cause "must comply or
be liable for damages." '
Other courts have concluded that in
such a situation, an employer is subject to potential liability if it
discharges an employee without conducting an adequate investigation to determine whether cause for the discharge actually
exists."2
In Ashway v. Ferrellgas,Inc.,"°3 for example, the existence of
an implied contract term requiring just cause for dismissal led a
federal district court in Arizona to conclude that, before discharging the plaintiff, the employer was required to investigate the
allegations of sexual harassment upon which the discharge was
based."°
The court reasoned that although few courts have

other contract claims were barred on that basis, while apparently not challenged
on appeal, received at least implicit approval from the Alaska Supreme Court. See
id. at 1347, 1350-55.
100. See id. at 1351 (observing that the collective bargaining agreement
"incorporated the standard of just cause for employee discipline"); see also Owens,
supra note 8, at 300 (observing that the plaintiff in Walt "was not an at-will
employee").
101. Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050,1056 (Alaska 1986).
102. See, e.g., Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App.),
review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993).
103. 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 375 (D. Ariz. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992).
104. Id. at 376. Many of the reported decisions discussing a duty to investigate
before discharging involve allegations that the discharged employee had engaged
in sexual harassment. This phenomenon may be attributable, at least in part, to
the legal obligation of employers to investigate the allegations of an employee
claiming to have been sexually harassed. See Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1987); Munford v. James T. Barnes
& Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993). The
court in Ashway, for example, described as "somewhat absurd" the proposition
that this obligation "protect[s] a complainant, but does not protect... [a] person
who has been accused," and observed that "public policy could support a dual duty
on the part of the employer to both the apparent victim and the accused to investigate charges of sexual harassment." Ashway, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
377; see also Lawson v. Boeing Co., 792 P.2d 545, 548 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)
(assuming, without deciding, that an employer may owe an employee accused of
sexual harassment "a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation"), review denied,
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addressed the meaning of contract provisions requiring just cause
for dismissal," 5 "leaving the determination solely up0' 6to the
employer would make the meaning of the term illusory.'
The conclusion that a contract term requiring cause for
dismissal obligates an employer to investigate allegations upon
which a discharge decision is to be based is not surprising."° As
noted earlier, courts and arbitrators long have held this view in
cases involving the interpretation of collective bargaining agree-

811 P.2d 219 (Wash. 1991).
However, not all courts share that view. In Martin v. Baer, 928 F.2d 1067,
1072 (11th Cir. 1991), for example, the court stated:
[The plaintiff] apparently claims that an implied duty to investigate exists
that runs not only to the alleged victims of harassment, but also to
persons accused of such harassment. Such a reading is an attenuated and
unwarranted stretch of [the defendant's] sexual harassment policy.
Although all parties involved in a company's investigation of sexual
harassment complaints obviously benefit from attempts to discover the
truth surrounding such complaints, . . .the primary emphasis of [the
defendant's] sexual harassment policies and procedures is on protecting
harassment victims.
105. Ashway, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 376 n.2; see Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 n.26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981):
Labor arbitrators have generated a large body of decisions interpreting
and applying such terms as "just cause" .. ., and some of their work may
be useful. It must be remembered, however, that arbitrators are selected
...on the basis, partly, of... their knowledge and judgment concerning
labor relations matters ....For courts to apply the same standards may
prove overly intrusive in some cases.
Cf. Warren Martin, Comment, Employment at Will: Just Cause
Protection Through MandatoryArbitration, 62 WASH. L. REV. 151, 16465 (1987) (concluding that labor arbitration decisions merely provide a
"useful starting place to define just cause in the wrongful termination
context," where just cause "must be analyzed independently").
106. Ashway, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 376 & n.2 (noting that "a
stated cause without some basis for belief is no cause at all").
107. See generally Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983) (observing that a "promise to dismiss an employee only for cause
would be illusory if the employer were permitted to be the sole judge and final
arbiter of the propriety of the ...discharge"); Young, supra note 3, at 223 n.126
("[A] subjective standard [of just cause] would be too susceptible to abuse. It
would be far too easy for an employer to prove his own subjective beliefs, so that
the rule would not adequately protect against opportunistic behavior by the
employer.").
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ments 0l' A number of courts have extended that view to cases
involving nonunion employment as well. a 9
Moreover, the applicability of this analysis does not appear to
be limited to cases involving provisions requiring "cause" for
discharge; an employer may also have a duty to investigate before
discharging when the employment contract enumerates "specific
reasons for dismissal.""'
In Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants,
Inc.,"' for example, the plaintiff brought suit against her former
employer alleging that it failed to discharge her in accordance with
the terms of her employment contract. 12 After a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, the employer appealed."'
Although the Washington Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for a new trial, 4 it noted that an employment handbook provided to the plaintiff specified various grounds for
immediate termination and concluded that the handbook constituted a part of the plaintiff's employment contract.' 5 The court
then held that "[i]n order for [the] plaintiff's discharge to have
been proper under the immediate discharge provision, [the
employer] must have conducted
an adequate investigation prior to
n6
terminating [the] plaintiff.""
A similar view was expressed in Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil,
Inc."7 In that case, the plaintiff had been employed by Pennzoil
as a vice president in charge of guest operations at a recreational
ranch in northern New Mexico.'
While employed in that

108. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; cf. Blades, supra note 3, at
1410 ("Through the 'just cause' provisions typically found in collective bargaining

agreements unions not only protect their constituents from discharges for ulterior
purposes, but also prohibit discharges for no reason or for reasons erroneously
believed by the employer to be justified." (emphasis added)).
109. See, e.g., Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 815 P.2d 1362, 1379

(Wash. 1991) (Brachtenbach, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that
to properly terminate for cause, the employer "should conduct an objectively
reasonable investigation to ascertain the facts").
110. Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App.), review
denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993).
111. 815 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1991).
112. Id. at 1365.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 1366.
115. Id. at 1366-67.
116. Id. at 1368.
117. 766 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989).
118. Id. at 281.
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capacity, he was accused of sexual harassment" 9 and other acts
Pennzoil initiated an investigation into the
of misconduct. 2
accusations, which consisted primarily of interviews of present and
Upon completion of
former female employees of the ranch.'
the interviews, the investigators presented Pennzoil officials with a
report summarizing the evidence they obtained."z The investigators then confronted the plaintiff with the allegations of sexual
harassment, which he denied."2
The plaintiff was informed of the names of the persons who
had been interviewed, and given an opportunity to comment about
each.' 24 Pennzoil also permitted the plaintiff to identify witnesses
who would speak on his behalf."z After a meeting with another
Pennzoil vice president, however, the plaintiff's employment was
terminated.'26
The plaintiff then filed suit against Pennzoil, claiming that he
was discharged without a fair investigation and consideration of the
evidence. 27 Pennzoil argued that the plaintiff was an at-will
employee who could be discharged for any reason, and alternatively, that if a valid reason for discharge was required, it had reasonable grounds to believe that its decision was justified." The jury
found by special verdict that the plaintiff's employment was not
terminable at-will and was subject to an implied contract requiring
a "good reason" for termination, and that "there was no good
reason to discharge

[the plaintiff]."' 29

Pennzoil then ap-

pealed."0
The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that there was
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the parties had
agreed to an implied contract permitting termination only for good
The court held that "the jury could have absolved
reason.'

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra note 104.
Kestenbaum, 766 P.2d at 281.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 281.
Id.
Id. at 285.
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Pennzoil of liability under [its] implied contract with [the plaintiff]
provided that Pennzoil had reasonable grounds to believe that
1 32
sufficient cause existed to justify [the plaintiff's] termination,'
but concluded that the jury's finding that Pennzoil failed to act
133
reasonably was supported by the evidence.
The court based its conclusion on the fact that Pennzoil's vice
president had failed to "take a close look at the way the investigation had been handled, but [instead had] relied upon the professionalism of his investigators."'' 34 Specifically, the court considered that the only document Pennzoil officials had reviewed before
discharging the plaintiff was the investigators' report, which "failed
to differentiate between first-hand knowledge, attributed hearsay,
or mere gossip or rumor,"135 and that Pennzoil had made no
'
attempt to "evaluate the credibility of the persons interviewed." 36
Ashway, Gaglidariand Kestenbaum suggest that a provision in
an employment contract requiring just cause, or a "good" or
"stated" reason, for dismissal obligates the employer to conduct a
reasonable investigation before terminating an employee and that
a failure to comply with that obligation constitutes a breach of the
employment contract.137 Indeed, the recognition of a duty to
investigate under those circumstances appears to be an unremarkable application of the "implied contract" exception to the
employment at-will rule. 38 It nevertheless remains unclear

132. Id. at 287.
133. Id. at 288.
134. Id.
135. An expert for the plaintiff identified "numerous deficiencies in the
investigation" and concluded that "Pennzoil's investigators did not observe the
standards of good investigative practice." Id.
136. Id.
137. See Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App.) ("To the
extent an employee has an employment contract requiring specific reasons for
dismissal, then the employer must conduct an adequate investigation or be liable
for breach of that contract."), review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993).
138. See Ashway v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 375, 376
& n.1 (D. Ariz. 1989), affd in part,rev'd in part,945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992). But cf.Martin v. Baer, 928 F.2d 1067, 1071-73 (11th
Cir. 1991) (rejecting the contention that policies and procedures set forth in a
personnel manual gave rise to a duty to investigate under the implied contract
exception).

1994]

DUTY TO INVESTIGATE

whether there is any basis for imposing a duty to investigate in
cases where no such contractual provision exists.13 9

C. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing May
Impose a Duty to Investigate
1. Alaska's Limited References to the Issue. In addition to
suggesting that an employer's failure to conduct a reasonable
investigation before discharging may breach a contractual "just
cause" provision, the court in Walt v. State4 ' indicated that the
failure to conduct an adequate pre-discharge investigation might
provide the discharged employee with a viable claim "based on a
bad faith, unfair discharge."'' Although the court's discussion of
the issue was cursory, its observation presumably was based on the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in the employment
relationship,14 the violation of which gives rise to a claim for
breach of contract under Alaska law. 143
The view that this implied covenant gives rise to a duty to
investigate is consistent with the position expressed by Judge
Kozinski's dissent in Sanders v. ParkerDrilling Co.'" In Sanders,
a Ninth Circuit decision interpreting Alaska law, 45 Judge Kozinski concluded that the employer's good faith obligation "protects
the employee from being dismissed based on personal animosity,
ill will and any other ulterior motive, ' ,1 46 and also "requires the
employer to conduct a reasonable investigation"
of the employee's
alleged conduct before discharging. 47

139. See generally Perritt, supra note 36, § 5.48, at 572 ("The majority of recent
decisions deny that any duty of care in supervising the employment relationship
arises in tort law, independent of contract.").
140. 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988).
141. Id. at 1351.
142. See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983).
143. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1226 (Alaska
1992); ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Alaska 1988); Owens,
supra note 8, at 305.
144. 911 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917 (1991).
145. See id. at 194; see also Young, supra note 3, at 202 n.7 (observing that the
court in Sanders "purported to apply Alaska law").
146. Sanders, 911 F.2d at 215 n.16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); cf. ARCO Alaska,
Inc., 753 P.2d at 1154-55 (evidence that the plaintiff "was terminated because of
personal animosity and not for any legitimate work-related reason" was sufficient
to present a claim for breach of the implied covenant to the jury).
147. Sanders, 911 F.2d at 215 n.16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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Unfortunately, Judge Kozinski's characterization of the implied
covenant was unaccompanied by any supporting analysis, presumably because the majority in Sanders found it unnecessary to
address the merits of the plaintiff's claim for breach of the
covenant.148 However, Judge Kozinski's conclusion that the
covenant may impose upon employers a duty to investigate before
discharging is consistent with the prevailing view in Montana 49
and, perhaps, in a few other states, as well. 50
2.

The View in Other States.

Subsequent to its decisions in

Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital' and Flanigan v.
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 52 the Montana Supreme Court revised the basis for its view that employers may have

a duty to investigate before discharging an employee. In Heltborg
v. Modern Machinery, 3 the plaintiff alleged that the employer
was negligent in "failing to exercise ordinary and reasonable care
in investigating the need to terminate.' 5 4 The court agreed with
the employer that the negligence allegations "were not essential in
either Crenshaw or Flanigan" because the alleged negligence in

148. See id. at 193 n.1; see also Young, supra note 3, at 208 n.51:
It is not clear from the Sanders court's decision on what theory the jury
found for the plaintiffs. On one view, it appears that the jury found that
[the employer] did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiffs used drugs in violation of company policy. On another
view, however, it appears that the jury found that [the employer] violated
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The majority in
Sanders appeared to adopt the former interpretation of the verdict; the
concurrence of Judge Reinhardt suggests that the jury may have found
for the plaintiffs on both theories, and Judge Kozinski's dissent interprets
the instruction as requiring only a good faith belief by the employer that
the employee committed the alleged act.
149. In Montana, however, claims for breach of the implied covenant have been
preempted by that state's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1991), in cases to which the act now applies.
Dagel v. City of Great Falls, 819 P.2d 186, 194-95 (Mont. 1991).
150. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 n.25 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (suggesting, without deciding, that the implied covenant may obligate
employers to provide "procedural safeguards such as ... [an] opportunity for

response to charges of misconduct").
151. 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984); see supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
152. 720 P.2d 257 (Mont.), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 980 (1986); see supra
notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
153. 795 P.2d 954 (Mont. 1990).
154. Id. at 959.
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those cases occurred "in conjunction with allegations properly
'
forming a basis for breach of the [implied] covenant."155
The
court then held that, in the employment context, a failure to
investigate can be actionable only as a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and that there is no "separate and
distinct tort of negligence" in employment cases.'56
The analysis in Heltborgwas recently applied by the Washing-

ton Court of Appeals in Lambert v. Morehouse."7 The plaintiff

in Lambert was terminated from a managerial position after more
than ten years of employment.'58 The termination resulted from
the employer's investigation of complaints that the plaintiff had
engaged in various incidents of sexual harassment." 9
Subsequent to his discharge, the plaintiff brought suit against
the employer and several of its management representatives,
asserting a claim for "negligent investigation."'' " After the trial
court granted the defendants' motions for partial summary
judgment, the plaintiff appealed, arguing that he had presented
sufficient evidence of negligence to preclude summary judgment in
favor of the employer. 6 '
In analyzing the plaintiff's negligent investigation claim, the
Washington Court of Appeals began by observing that there may
be circumstances under which Washington law would impose a duty
to investigate, such as where a state agency's deficient investigation

155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Kittelson v. Archie Cochrane Motors, Inc., 813 P.2d 424, 426

(Mont. 1991) (observing that after Heltborg "negligent discharge is no longer a
recognized exception" to the at-will rule in Montana); Martin v. Special Resource

Management, Inc., 803 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Mont. 1990) (observing that, in light of
Heltborg, "no duty exists in employers to use reasonable care in decisions to

discharge based upon a theory of negligence").
157. 843 P.2d 1116 (Wash Ct. App.), review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993).

158. Id. at 1117. For many courts, the plaintiffs longevity of service may be a
significant factor in analyzing a claim for breach of the implied covenant. See, e.g.,
Burdette v. Mepco/Electra, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 1987)
(suggesting that "a claimant [must] establish longevity of service before she can
invoke the [implied] covenant"); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (observing that "it seems difficult to defend termination
of... a long-time employee arbitrarily, i.e., without some legitimate reason, as
compatible with either good faith or fair dealing").

159. Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1117-18.
160. Id. at 1118.
161. Id.
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could result in child abuse. 62 However, the court noted that the
Washington appellate courts have declined to recognize a claim for
negligent investigation in other contexts. 63 The court observed
that the plaintiff failed to explain why a duty to investigate should
be imposed in the employment context"s and declined to recognize a 5cause of action for negligent investigation in employment
cases.

16

In the Lambert court's view, an employer that agreed to
contractual terms requiring specific grounds for the dismissal of an
employee would be subject to liability for breach of contract if it
failed to conduct an adequate investigation into the reasons for the
employee's discharge. 66 Where the employment relationship is
at-will, however, the imposition of a duty to investigate "would
appear to conflict with the employer's right to discharge the
employee for any cause or no cause without liability."' 67
The Lambert court acknowledged that at one time Montana
recognized a tort claim for negligent investigation in employment
cases. 68 It nevertheless observed that in light of the Montana
Supreme Court's decision in Heltborg,169 Montana no longer
imposes a duty to investigate "beyond the duty not to breach the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.', 70 Because, unlike
Montana, Washington does not recognize an implied covenant of

162. Id. at 1119 n.2 (citing Babcock v. Washington, 809 P.2d 143 (Wash. 1991)
(involving a claim against social service caseworkers for negligent foster care
investigation and placement)). One commentator has concluded that Alaska also
would recognize a claim for negligent investigation in the child abuse context. See

Susan L. Abbott, Note, Liability of the State and its Employees for the Negligent
Investigation of Child Abuse Reports, 10 ALAsKA L. REv. 401 (1993).
163. Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1119. The Washington Court of Appeals cited Dever
v. Fowler, 816 P.2d 1237 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 828 P.2d 563

(Wash. 1992), for the proposition that a claim for negligent investigation does not
extend to defective prosecutions. Id.
164. Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1119 n.2.
165. Id. at 1118-20.
166. Id. at 1119.
167. Id. at 1120.
168. Id. at 1119 (citing Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487
(Mont. 1984) and Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257
(Mont.), appealdismissed, 479 U.S. 980 (1986)).

169. 795 P.2d 954 (Mont. 1990); see supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
170. Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1119.
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good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts, 171 the court
concluded that it would be inappropriate to impose upon employers
an extra-contractual duty to use due care in investigating reasons
for discharge.'
A federal district court in Indiana reached a similar conclusion
in Gossage v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. 73 In that case, the
plaintiff was employed as a management trainee for a corporation
operating a chain of pizza restaurants. 74 After being discharged
for suspected theft of company funds, the plaintiff brought suit
claiming that the employer had breached a "duty of due care owed
by an employer to an employee-at-will."' 75 The plaintiff cited
both Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc.1 76 and Crenshaw v. Bozeman
Deaconess Hospital177 in support of her argument.178 The court
declined to recognize the cause of action, however, holding that
Chamberlainand Crenshaw were inapplicable because the "Indiana
courts.., have not recognized a duty of79 good faith and fair dealing
in the context of wrongful discharge.',
It appears from these cases that whatever support the Montana
Supreme Court's decisions in Crenshaw' and Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n' might provide for the
imposition of a duty to investigate before discharging has been
limited to jurisdictions recognizing an implicit covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship." Indeed,
one can argue that the applicability of Crenshaw and Flaniganis
limited to jurisdictions that interpret the implied covenant to

171. See Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621, 624-25 (Wash. 1988);

Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1086-87 (Wash. 1984).
172. Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1119-20.
173. 698 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind. 1988).

174. Id. at 161.
175. Id.
176. 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982).

177. 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984).
178. Gossage, 698 F. Supp. at 161.

179. Id. at 163.
180.
181.
182.
review

693 P.2d 487 (1984).
720 P.2d 257 (Mont.), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 980 (1986).
See, e.g., Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App.),
denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993).
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require "cause" for discharge,"8 3 of which Montana may be the
only current example.1"4

3. A Duty to Investigate May Exist in JurisdictionsWhere the
Implied Covenant Requires Cause for Discharge.

The view that

employers have a general duty to investigate before discharging
only if the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
interpreted to require cause for discharge is illustrated by the
Wyoming Supreme Court's recent decision in Wilder v. Cody

Country Chamber of Commerce. 5 The plaintiff in Wilder had
been employed as the executive director of the Cody Country

Chamber of Commerce.186

He resigned in lieu of being dis-

charged after the Chamber's Board of Directors learned that he

concealed from the Board certain financial difficulties that the
Chamber of Commerce was experiencing.Y After his resignation, the plaintiff filed suit against the Chamber."

He argued

that his employment was to be "permanent" for "as long as [he]
183. California, and a number of other states that recognize an iiplied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context, have concluded that
"with regard to an at-will employment relationship, breach of the ... covenant
cannot logically be based on a claim that a discharge was made without good
cause." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 400 n.39 (Cal. 1988); see
also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985)
("We . . .recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment-at-will contract, although that covenant does not create a duty for the
employer to terminate the employee only for good cause."). Underlying this
conclusion is the view that although the implied covenant "protects the right of the
parties... to receive the benefits of the agreement that they have entered into,"
a guarantee of "continued employment or tenure" is not "one of the agreed
benefits to the at-will employee." Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1040. "The covenant
does not protect the employee from a 'no cause' termination because tenure was
never a benefit inherent in the at-will agreement." Id.
184. See Perritt, supra note 36, § 4.26, at 316 ("[I]n no jurisdiction must an
employer show just cause, with the possible exception of Montana, where an
employer is burdened to show a 'fair and honest reason' for a dismissal to escape
liability under the [implied] covenant." (quoting Coombs v. Gamer Shoe Co., 778
P.2d 885, 887 (Mont. 1989) and Stark v. Circle K Corp., 751 P.2d 162, 167 (Mont.
1988))). But see Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting the argument that "[p]roof that the employer did not have good cause
to terminate the employee is ... insufficient as a matter of law to establish a
breach of the implied covenant").
185. 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994).
186. Id. at 214.
187. Id. at 214-15.
188. Id. at 215.
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did the work that was required"'89 and alleged that the Board had
breached "a duty of reasonable care.., by [its] failure to properly
investigate the financial problems at the Chamber" prior to making
the decision to discharge him.' 90 The trial court granted the
Chamber's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff
appealed.'91
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that the only
authority the plaintiff had cited in support of his position was the
Montana Supreme Court's decision in Crenshaw v. Bozeman
Deaconess Hospital,'" which the Wilder court indicated held that
"a negligence cause of action was stated by the employer's failure
to properly investigate allegations of impropriety before terminating the employee for cause.' ' 193 Despite the decision in Crenshaw,
however, the Wyoming Supreme Court was "persuaded that no tort
cause of action exists for negligent investigation in employment
relationships."' 94 It concluded that Crenshaw did not alter that
fact because, in Heltborg v. Modern Machinery,95 the Montana
Supreme Court "limit[ed] Crenshaw by stating that the employer's
duty to use reasonable care is restricted to situations involving
'
negligent investigation of a for cause termination."196
Therefore,
because the Chamber had not dismissed the plaintiff in Wilder for
cause, but instead had chosen to dismiss him "as an at will
employee . . . [while] the investigation into [the Chamber's]
financial problems ... was [still] being conducted," there was no

189. Id. at 214.
190. Id. at 222.
191. Id. at 215-16.
192. 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984).

193. Wilder, 868 P.2d at 222.
194. Id. Quoting Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116,1119 (Wash. Ct. App.),

review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993), the Wilder court stated:
[E]mployment creates a contractual relationship. If that contract is
breached, relief lies with an action for breach of contract. "To the extent
an employee has an employment contract requiring specific reasons for

dismissal, then the employer must conduct an adequate investigation or
be liable for breach of that contract."
Wilder, 868 P.2d at 222. The Wilder court also cited Morris v. Hartford Courant

Co., 513 A.2d 66, 68 (Conn. 1986), which dismissed a claim for negligent
investigation because a discharge that results from a "fail[ure] to investigate [a]

charge 'reasonably and adequately' is not "demonstrably improper." (Emphasis
deleted).

195. 795 P.2d 954 (Mont. 1990).
196. Wilder, 868 P.2d at 222.
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breach of a duty to investigate before discharging that could give
rise to a tort claim for negligence."
The conclusion that employers have a duty to investigate
before discharging only if the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing requires cause for discharge is also supported by the
decision of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts in Treadwell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co."8 The plaintiff in Treadwell claimed that he had been forced
to accept involuntary retirement in lieu of termination after twentyeight years of employment. 99 He brought suit alleging claims for
breach of contract and negligence, premised on the contention that
the employer. failed to warn him that he was in jeopardy of being
terminated if his performance did not improve.2"
In partially dismissing the plaintiff's breach of contract claim,
the court found no evidence that the plaintiff was promised
employment for a specified period or that he was told that he could
be discharged only for cause, and, therefore, concluded that his
employment was terminable at will." 1 Because employers are
free to discharge at-will employees whose performance has been
satisfactory "or even excellent," the court concluded that a breach
of contract claim could not be premised upon an alleged obligation
to "apprise [the] plaintiff of unsatisfactory work
performance or of
' 22
the fact that his termination was imminent. 0
With respect to the plaintiff's negligence claim, which was
premised upon Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc.,03 the court observed
that the critical issue was whether employers have "some duty of
care with regard to . . . evaluation that [is] imposed by law,

independent of the promises of the parties. ' '21 In the employment at-will context, the court concluded, such a duty could be
imposed only by virtue of the existence of a covenant of good faith
25
and fair dealing implicit in the employment relationship.
Because in Massachusetts an action for breach of the implied
197. Id.
198. 666 F. Supp. 278 (D. Mass. 1987).
199. Id. at 280.

200. Id. at 288.
201.
202.
203.
(W.D.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 288-89 (discussing Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067
Mich. 1982)).
Id. at 290.
Id.
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covenant sounds in contract rather than tort,20 6 the court conclud-

ed that the plaintiff's claim for "negligent performance of promises
to ... conduct job evaluations" failed to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted.2 7
The court went on to hold that, in any event, "the inadequate
performance of... job reviews would not constitute breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."2 " The court
cited Tenedios v. Win. Filene's Sons Co. 219 in support of that

conclusion, noting that the Massachusetts Court of Appeals had
held in that case that there could be "no liability for a dismissal
investigation. '210

resulting from an inadequate

The plaintiff in Tenedios had been discharged from her

position as a sales clerk after being accused of helping a customer
attempt to steal a sweater from her employer's store.2 1 ' Relying
upon the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in Fortune v.

National Cash Register Co.,212 which many consider to be the
seminal case recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the employment context,2t ' the plaintiff in Tenedios

206. Id. Alaska also treats a claim premised upon a breach of the implied
covenant as a contractual action, rather than one sounding in tort. See ARCO
Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Alaska 1988). That view is
consistent with the manner in which most courts that recognize such a claim
interpret the implied covenant. See Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 570 A.2d
12,14-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), petitionfor certificationdenied, 584 A.2d 218
(N.J. 1990); Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 772 P.2d 288, 294 (Mont. 1989)
(Weber, J., dissenting); see also Jason R. Erb, Note, The Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Alaska: One Court's License to Override
ContractualExpectations, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 35, 36 (1994) (criticizing the Alaska
Supreme Court for increasingly using the covenant "as a tool to effect public
policy"). However, a few courts have left open the possibility that a breach of the
implied covenant "could, under certain limited circumstances, be the basis for tort
liability." D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 215 (Nev. 1991); see also Wilder v.
Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211,221-22 (Wyo. 1994) (discussing D'Angelo with approval).
207. Treadwell, 666 F. Supp. at 290.
208. Id.
209. 479 N.E.2d 723 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
210. Treadwell, 666 F. Supp. at 290.
211. Tenedios, 479 N.E.2d at 724-25.
212. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
213. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1039 n.7
(Ariz. 1985) ("Some courts trace the recognition of the good faith covenant in
employment-at-will contracts to Fortune .... ").

260
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brought suit against
the employer for "wrongful termination of
214
employment.
The Tenedios court first noted that the analysis in Fortunewas
not controlling because the plaintiffs employment was governed by
a collective bargaining agreement. 2 15 Because both parties had
"assume[d] that the doctrine of the Fortune case would apply,"
however, the court proceeded to address the merits of the plaintiff's
claim.216 The court then concluded that even assuming that the
plaintiff's discharge "was a product of inadequate investigation,"
there had been "no such breach of an [implied] covenant of fair
dealing as is embraced by the Fortune rule."2'17 The court explained that a discharge "contrived to despoil an employee of
earned commissions or similar compensation due for past services
will qualify under Fortune, ' as will "a discharge actuated by a

214. Tenedios, 479 N.E.2d at 725.
215. See id. ("[T]he plaintiff's employment was covered by a collective
bargaining agreement and was not an employment at will, to which alone the
Fortune doctrine applies."); see also Price v. United Parcel Serv., 601 F. Supp. 20,
23 (D. Mass. 1984) (concluding that "the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing has no application" where the plaintiff is "protected by a union-negotiated

collective bargaining agreement"). But cf. Greater Kansas City Laborers Dist.
Council v. Builders' Ass'n, 213 F. Supp. 429, 433 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (citing
Archibald Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482
(1959), while observing that "the principle... that 'in every contract there exists
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing' . . is particularly applicable
to collective bargaining agreements"), aff'd, 326 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 917 (1964).
Other courts have dealt with this issue differently. In Foster v. Albertsons,
Inc., 835 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1992), for example, the Montana Supreme Court
concluded that "an implied covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] arises from
or is implied in [a] collective bargaining agreement," but held that a claim for
breach of the covenant is preempted by federal law. Id. at 726. The court
reasoned that because the implied covenant "arises from the underlying contract
of employment," questions involving "the existence and breach of [the] covenant
necessarily require placing the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in
issue," and that "[c]ollective bargaining agreements must be interpreted by
application of federal law, not state law." Id.
216. Tenedios, 479 N.E.2d at 725 (citations omitted). The court caustically
commented on this point: "For purposes of the appeal, we are content to allow
the parties to make their own law." Id.
217. Id. at 725-26.
218. Id. at 726; see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d
1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985) ("The [implied] covenant... protect[s] an employee from
a discharge based on an employer's desire to avoid the payment of benefits
already earned by the employee, such as the sales commissions in Fortune....").
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reason that offends a public policy .... ."" However, because in
Massachusetts the implied covenant does not impose upon

employers a duty to discharge only for just cause,22 discharging
an employee "arbitrarily" and without an adequate pre-discharge
investigation does not constitute a breach of the covenant,

"however meretricious... the dismissal [may] have been."
4. Alaska's Interpretation of the Implied Covenant.

1

The

significance of Massachusetts' view of the implied covenant for
cases arising in Alaska is unclear. One court, after observing that
Massachusetts considers the covenant to be breached "only if the
discharge results in loss of compensation that is clearly identifiable
and related to the employee's past service, such as future commissions based upon past sales," concluded that "Alaska purports to

follow the rule as formulated in Massachusetts." 2 That conclusion undoubtedly is based upon the Alaska Supreme Court's
reliance upon a series of Massachusetts cases, including Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co.,' in adopting the implied covenant
exception to the employment at-will rule.

4

In addition, despite

repeatedly having indicated that the covenant of good faith and fair

219. Tenedios, 479 N.E.2d at 726. Alaska also holds that a "[v]iolation of
[public] policy by an employer may rise to the level of a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,
768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989); see also Knight v. American Guard & Alert,
Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska 1986) (observing that "the public policy approach
is largely encompassed within the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing"); Owens, supra note 8, at 309 n.218 ("[T]he Alaska Supreme Court...
has acknowledged that discharges in violation of public policy can constitute a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); Erb, supra note
206, at 46 (arguing that by subjecting the covenant to considerations of public
policy, "[t]he court has increasingly used the implied covenant as a tool for
furthering social policy. In so doing, the court has imposed something of a code
of ethics into the law of contracts above and beyond the reasonable expectations
of the parties."). However, the converse apparently is not true: the Alaska
Supreme Court has described as "unsound" the view that breaches of the implied
covenant should be regarded as falling within the public policy exception to the
employment at-will rule. ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 n.1
(Alaska 1988).
220. Tenedios, 479 N.E.2d at 726 n.4.
221. Id. at 726.
222. Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 213 (N.D. 1987)
(citing Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983)).
223. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
224. See Mitford, 666 P.2d at 1006-07.
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dealing is implicit in all at-will employment relationships,2 5 the
Alaska Supreme Court has -cited the Massachusetts Supreme

Court's decision in Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.2 26 for
the proposition that "there is not a uniform right to just cause for
termination" in employment cases.'
In Gram, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that

although the jury was warranted in finding that the plaintiff's
discharge was "the product of [an] inadequate investigation, 2 28
an employer cannot be held liable for breach of the implied
covenant "simply because there was no good cause for [an]
employee's discharge."" In a portion of the opinion subsequently cited with approval by the Alaska Supreme Court z0 the Gram
court stated:
We attribute no particular significance to the absence of internal
administrative procedures for determining the propriety of [the]
discharge. If there had been such procedures, including a fair
opportunity for [the employee] to state his position before an
impartial superior, and [the employee] had nevertheless been
discharged, the fact would remain that [the employee] was
discharged without good cause. It is difficult to determine
whether it is worse to discharge an employee without good cause
where no adequate investigation was conducted or to do so after
a full hearing that resulted in an improper decision that there
was good cause."l

225. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1223
(Alaska 1992); Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789 (Alaska
1989); ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska 1988); Rutledge
v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Alaska 1986).
226. 429 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1981).
227. Rutledge, 727 P.2d at 1056; see also Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d
191, 199 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (observing that although
Alaska has recognized "an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all
at-will employment contracts," only "certain employment contracts for an
indefinite term fare] terminable by the employer only for good cause") (quoting
Rutledge, 727 P.2d at 1056), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917 (1991).
228. Gram, 429 N.E.2d at 28.
229. Id. at 26; see also id. at 28 ("We decline.., to adopt a general rule that
the discharge of an at-will employee without cause is alone a violation of an
employer's obligation of good faith and fair dealing. We are aware of no case that
has gone this far.").
230. See Rutledge, 727 P.2d at 1056.
231. Gram, 429 N.E.2d at 28-29 n.9. The analysis in Gram also was relied upon
by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals in determining that a discharge that is the
"product of an inadequate investigation" does not violate the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Tenedios v. Wm.Filene's Sons, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 723,
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On the other hand, there are a number of reasons for
concluding that courts in Alaska might interpret the covenant to
impose upon employers a duty to investigate before discharging.'3 The Alaska Supreme Court has indicated that the prohibition upon an employer "impair[ing] the right of an employee to
receive the benefits of the employment agreement" is merely the
"minimum" that the implied covenant requires. 23' In addition,
one commentator discussing Alaska's view of the employment atwill rule has observed that the implied covenant "is broad enough
to allow recovery for any discharge which a jury finds was 'unfair'
or in 'bad faith."'
Perhaps most importantly, however, in adopting the implied
covenant exception, the Alaska Supreme Court cited with apparent
approval a law review note235 that states that "in order to give
content to the good faith standard," the courts should "look to the
large body of arbitration decisions that have . . . developed

relatively clear and workable standards for defining unjust
6
In the arbitration context, the note's author
dismissals. '""m
observed, "the arbitrator considers whether the employer's decision
to fire the worker followed a fair procedure and was reasonable in
7
the light of surrounding circumstances. ' ' "m
Significantly, the author cited the decision in Grief Bros.
Cooperage Corp. 8 in support of this analysis."39 The arbitrator

725-26 & n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
232. See, e.g., Owens, supra note 8, at 279 (observing that the implied covenant
permits an employer to discharge an employee "only on a good faith belief that
the discharge is warranted").
233. Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789 (Alaska 1989).
But see Erb, supra note 206, at 36 (arguing that the covenant in any contract
protects nothing more than the expected benefits of the agreement).
234. Owens, supra note 8, at 309; cf Perritt, supra note 36, § 4.55, at 392 ("The
early cases suggested that a breach of the covenant could be shown by a nearly
infinite variety of employer decisions, which in the opinion of the fact finder,
contravened good faith or fair dealing.").
235. See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 n.2 (Alaska 1983) (citing
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith,93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter Note]).
236. Note, supra note 235, at 1840. But see Young, supra note 3, at 216
(observing that "arbitration decisions ... are not a reliable basis for use by courts
faced with private employment contracts").
237. Note, supra note 235, at 1840 n.133.
238. 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 555 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.).
239. Note, supra note 235, at 1840 n.133.
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in GriefBros. held that a discharge can be upheld only if a fair and
objective investigation of the employee's conduct produces
"substantial evidence" that the employee violated a rule or order
of management. 40 The arbitrator also indicated that, except in
situations where the employer has no alternative but to "react
immediately to the employee's behavior," its investigation
"must.
241
•.be made before its disciplinary decision is made.
The importance that the arbitrator in GriefBros. placed upon
the duty to investigate is clear from the particular facts of that
case.24 2 The grievant there had been discharged while "in effect
...on probation" as the result of prior warnings and discipline he
had received. 243 The arbitrator observed that although the
grievant's conduct "might not have been serious enough to warrant
dismissal if the offense had been a first one," the discharge would
have been upheld "[i]f [his] guilt had been properly established by
a fair pre-discharge investigation" because his prior disciplinary
record was so poor that "even a proven minor offense would have
been enough to justify his discharge."'
Because there had been
"no proper pre-discharge investigation," however, the arbitrator
245
found it "impossible . . to rule that the discharge must 'stick."'
The arbitrator provided the following colorful explanation for that
conclusion:
Every accused employee in an industrial democracy has the right
of "due process of law" and the right to be heard before
discipline is administered. These rights are precious to all free
men and are not lightly or hastily to be disregarded or denied.
The Arbitrator is fully mindful of the Company's need for,
equity in, and right to require careful, safe, efficient performance
by its employees. But before the Company can discipline an
employee for failure to meet said requirement, the Company
must take pains to establish such failure. Maybe [the grievant]
was guilty as hell; maybe also there are many gangsters who go
free because of legal technicalities. And this is doubtless
unfortunate. But company and government prosecutors must
understand that the legal technicalities exist also to protect the

240. Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 557-58.
241. Id. at 558; see also Lockheed Corp., 83 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1018, 1023
(1984) (Taylor, Arb.) ("It is important that the [accused employee's] 'day in court'
be given before a decision to impose discipline is made.").
242. See Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 557

(observing that the duty to investigate has "great weight in any discipline case").
243. Id. at 556-57.

244. Id. at 557.
245. Id.
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innocent from unjust, unwarranted punishment. Society is
willing to let the presumably guilty go free on technical grounds
innocent men can be secure from arbitrary,
in order that free,
2 46
capricious action.

The correctness of the arbitrator's sweeping suggestion that all
employees are entitled to a full panoply of due process rights
before discipline is administered is debatable,247 particularly in the

at-will context.248 Nevertheless, intimations of a similar view
appear in Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,249 where the
Alaska Supreme Court indicated that the implied covenant of good
or an
faith and fair dealing requires more than "honesty"'
' ' on the part of the employer. Because
"absence of evil motive"2
the covenant also requires that the employer reach its decision to
discharge in a manner that is "objectively fair" 2 -that is, "in a

246. Id.; cf DeVry Inst. of Technology, 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1149, 1157
(1986) (Berman, Arb.):
[B]asic considerations of due process ... require the employer to: (1)
notify the charged employee of the charges against him; (2) inform him
of the nature of the evidence in its possession so that he might respond
to it; and (3) commence and complete [an] investigation within a
reasonable period, at the conclusion of which either the charges will be
dropped or the employee will be disciplined.
247. See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co., 53 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 45,5657 (1969) (Stouffer, Arb.) (concluding that grievants "were not deprived of 'due
process' by the Company's refusal to interview them before imposing . . .
discipline" because the employer had no procedural obligations independent of
those specified in the collective bargaining agreement).
248. See, e.g., Crosier v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 367 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983) (observing that "there is no precedent for extending procedural
due process or fair hearing requirements to at will employees"); cf. Young, supra
note 3, at 225:
The criminal law presumption of innocence does not seem appropriate
in contract law, where we can view one party as vested with some kind
of property right. The property right is either the employer's right to fire
without proof of an act justifying termination for cause, or the employee's right to require proof of an act constituting just cause.
249. 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992).
250. Id. at 1224 (quoting RESTATEMENT

d (1981)).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1225.
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manner which a reasonable person would regard as fair" 3-- it
can be violated by mere inaction on the part of an employer. 4
The employer in Luedtke was found to have violated the
covenant by testing the plaintiff for drug use without providing him
with prior notice-and under circumstances where "no other
employee was similarly tested" 5 -- and then suspending him
"immediately upon learning of the results of the test.""2S6

The

court appears to have been concerned with precisely the same right
that prompted the arbitrator in Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp. 7 to
impose a duty to investigate before discharging-the right to be
heard before discipline is administered. 8

253. Id. at 1224. Similarly, in ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1156
(Alaska 1988), the court upheld a jury instruction interpreting the covenant to
require employers to act not only in "good faith," but "fairly" and "reasonably"
as well. In Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hospital, 779 P.2d 783, 789 n.6
(Alaska 1989), the court held that the covenant "also requires that an employer
treat like employees alike." Cf. Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 555, 558 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.) (concluding that a discharge cannot
stand unless the employer has "applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination to all employees").
254. Luedtke, 834 P.2d at 1224.
255. Id. at 1226. With respect to the latter point, the court made the following
observation:
Because we conclude that [the employer] violated the covenant, we need
not address ... whether [the plaintiff] was treated differently than other
employees in similar circumstances. We do note, however, that the
superior court should have addressed this argument .... [The employer]
claims that ...

evidence [of] differential treatment ...

would not be

relevant to whether it acted fairly and in good faith. [The employer's]
position is inconsistent with our earlier cases on good faith and fair
dealing.
Id. at 1226 n.3.
256. Id. at 1226.
257. 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 555 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.).
258. Id. at 557-58. Among other things, the court in Luedtke observed that the
plaintiff had been suspended "before he was given the option of a retest or any
other options." Luedtke, 834 P.2d at 1223. If the drug test administered to the
plaintiff resulted in a "false positive," that fact might have been discovered by an
investigation that included the possibility of retesting. See, e.g., Burka v. New
York City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 836-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Indeed, the
Luedtke court had alluded to that possibility in an earlier opinion in the case.
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1136 n.11 (Alaska 1989).
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IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Alaska is among a minority of jurisdictions that recognize an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
context. 9 Although the covenant does not impose upon employers an obligation to discharge only for cause,26' a number of
to conduct a
courts have suggested that it may require employers
26
reasonable investigation before discharging. '

259. Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); see also Young, supra
note 3, at 206 ("Alaska . . . [is] one of a minority of states recognizing that all
employment contracts contain[] an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."); see generally Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206,
214 (N.D. 1987) (referring to the fact that an "emerging majority of... states..
. have rejected the implication of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts"); Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union,
384 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 1986) ("For sound policy reasons, a majority of...
jurisdictions have ...rejected the implication of a covenant of good faith termination.").
260. See Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Alaska
1986) (observing that "there is not a uniform right to just cause for termination");
see generally Perritt, supra note 36, § 4.26, at 316-17:
Despite [the] theoretical potential for the [implied] covenant doctrine, in
no jurisdiction must an employer show just cause, with the possible
exception of Montana .... Indeed, the ... courts of [several states]
have expressly disavowed any idea that a breach of the covenant can be
shown merely by showing dismissal without good cause.
261. See, e.g., Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App.),
review denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993); Heltborg v. Modem Mach., 795 P.2d
954, 961 (Mont. 1990). Although requiring employers to investigate before
discharging may seem to make little sense if employers can discharge without
cause, see Hollars v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 792 P.2d 1146, 1156 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1989) (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. quashed, 791
P.2d 465 (N.M. 1990), there is room for a contrary argument based upon the fact
that the implied covenant may impose upon employers "a duty not to discharge
for an improper reason." Heltborg,795 P.2d at 961 (emphasis added). In Alaska,
for example, discharging an employee for an "unconstitutional" reason violates the
implied covenant. State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 318 (Alaska 1984). An employer
might be able to defend such a claim by showing that it had investigated and
concluded in good faith that its reason for discharging was not unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Johnson v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 40 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1651, 1653 (D.S.D. 1986) (concluding that there could be no breach
of the implied covenant where the employer had conducted "a thorough
investigation of the ... charges against [the] [p]laintiffs prior to making a final
decision to discharge" because an "extensive [pre-discharge] investigation in itself
is evidence of [an employer's] good faith and fair dealing in its relationship with
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There appear to be two potentially competing views on this
issue. 62 On one hand, the Alaska Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to protect employees from abuses of an
employer's right to discharge at will 63 by "modify[ing] . . . [the]
doctrine with relatively new contract theories,"2" of which the
implied covenant exception is but one example.265 Job security
266
is, moreover, of such fundamental importance to employees
that a "forceful argument" undoubtedly can be made in favor of a
rule requiring cause for the discharge of any employee.267 Interpreting the implied covenant to impose such a requirement would
be meaningless unless the requirement included an obligation to
investigate to determine whether cause for discharge actually
exists." Consistent with that view, one line of cases suggests that
Alaska may interpret the implied covenant to impose upon
employers a duty to investigate before discharging. 69
[its employees]").
262. See generally Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789
(Alaska 1989) (observing that the implied covenant "does not lend itself to precise
definition"); Erb, supra note 206, at 37-38 (observing that "courts and commentators historically have had difficulty defining the implied obligation of good faith
and fair dealing").
263. See Crook, supra note 7, at 39.
264. Owens, supra note 8, at 299.
265. See generally Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1224
(Alaska 1992); ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Alaska
1988).
266. See Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 196 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917 (1991).
267. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21, 28 (Mass. 1981); cf Sanders,
911 F.2d at 197 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (observing that a provision requiring
just cause for dismissal is "crucial to an employee's sense of personal security and
stability").
268. See Ashway v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 375, 376
& n.2 (D. Ariz. 1989), affd in part,rev'd in part, 945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992); cf. Southern Cal. Edison Corp., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH)
8129, at 3636 (1987) (Collins, Arb.) (observing that "procedural
requirements are an essential element of [a] just cause standard"); Patricia A.
Konopka, Comment, Combatting Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Without
Risking a Wrongful DischargeLawsuit: An Employer's Dilemma?, 42 KAN. L.
REV. 437,444 (1994) ("Whether the employer conducted an adequate investigation
before discharging the employee impacts the ultimate decision of whether the
employer had just cause to discharge the employee.").
269. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1224-26
(Alaska 1992); Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345,1351 (Alaska 1988); Sanders, 911 F.2d
at 215 n.16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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On the other hand, the Alaska Supreme Court has indicated
that there is no uniform right to just cause for termination in
Alaska."
Thus, another line of cases suggests that Alaska
interprets the implied covenant in accordance with the view
prevailing in Massachusetts,27 1 where a discharge based upon an
inadequate investigation does not violate the covenant.272
From a policy standpoint, the interest of employees in
continued employment, although certainly important,273 must be
balanced against the employer's interest in "running [its] business
as [it] sees fit."' 74 Requiring employers to investigate before
discharging would be economically inefficient275 to the extent that
the resulting restriction on their freedom to terminate276 would

270. Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050,1056 (Alaska 1986).
271. See, e.g., Rutledge, 727 P.2d at 1056; Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000,
1006-07 (Alaska 1983); cf. Tenedios v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 479 N.E.2d 723,726
n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (rejecting the contention that "discharge without just
cause could constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith"); see
generally Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206,213 (N.D. 1987)
(concluding that Alaska has adopted Massachusetts' view of the implied covenant).
272. Treadwell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 278, 290 (D.
Mass. 1987); Tenedios, 479 N.E.2d at 725-26; Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429
N.E.2d 21, 26, 28-29 n.9 (Mass. 1981).
273. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 470 (Md. 1981)
(concluding that "an at will employee's interest in job security... is deserving of
recognition"); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (observing that an at will employee "has a strong interest in the
stability of his employment"); Blades, supra note 3, at 1425 (concluding that "an
employee's interest in an at will employment relationship is... deserving of legal
protection").
274. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wash. 1984); see
also Adler, 432 A.2d at 470 (stating that "the employer has an important interest
in being able to discharge an at will employee whenever it would be beneficial to
his business"); Crosier, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (observing that an employer "must
be permitted ample latitude in disciplining its personnel").
275. See Young, supra note 3, at 211-12 (requiring employers to "exercise more
caution about firing employees" is "counter-productive from the view of economic
efficiency"). But see Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in
Changing State Law: The Employment at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 227, 251 (1984) ("[A] discharge for reasons other than just cause will
tend to affront the public interest in economic efficiency. .. ").
276. See Heltborg v. Modem Mach., 795 P.2d 954,961 (Mont. 1990) (concluding
that imposing a duty to use reasonable care in discharging an employee effectively
would "eviscerat[e] the concept of employer latitude in decision-making").
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cause them to retain incompetent or unnecessary employees. 277

Employee morale in turn might suffer from the retention of
unreliable or incompetent employees.278 There is also some cost
involved in gathering evidence regarding, and documenting the
basis for, an employee's termination 279 that employers could be
expected to pass on to consumers.n °

Ironically, the recognition of a duty to investigate may also
detrimentally impact employees, 281 since "[e]mployers may be less
willing to 'take a chance' on a marginal applicant if termination is
made [more] difficult."''
Indeed, whether a particular business
succeeds in today's highly competitive marketplace is largely
dependent upon the personnel decisions that it makes.

3

By

limiting the flexibility of employers in making those decisions, the
recognition of a duty to investigate before discharging may force
some marginal employers out of business, in which case many
employees would suffer.'
In short, the recognition of a duty to investigate before
discharging is likely to inhibit the exercise of much employer
discretion generally thought to be legitimate and desirable.25

277. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 452 (N.C. 1989) (Meyer,
J., dissenting); Martin, supra note 105, at 151.
278. Coman, 381 S.E.2d at 452 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
279. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
280. See Young, supra note 3, at 221 ("It is acceptable for employers to pass
along their increased costs through commerce, because doing so efficiently spreads
the costs and prevents any one person, such as the employee, from bearing the full
cost of the decision to terminate."); cf. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 244 (Alaska
1976) (referring to "the adoption in Alaska of the policy of risk-spreading, the
policy that society, rather than the injured individual, should bear the cost of..
negligence").
281. See Bingham, supra note 19, at 387-88 (observing that "the cost[s] of
preventative measures to avoid wrongful termination liability are ...

significant

enough to influence companies['] utilization of labor").
282. Coman, 381 S.E.2d at 452 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see also Perritt, supra
note 36, § 9.4, at 207 n.76 ("Some economists argue that limiting employers' right
to dismiss at will tends to make employers more reluctant to hire new employees.").
283. LaGoe v. Duber Indus. Sec., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987), vacated, 782 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 1989).
284. See Stuart Henry, A State-by-State Comparisonof Recent Developments in
Legislative Proposalson Employment Termination Law for Private Nonunionized
Employees, 1 J. INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RTs. 93, 101 (1992).
285. See generally Owens, supra note 8, at 306 (referring to "the effect that
expanded liability may have on legitimate employer discretion in the workplace"
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That fact has prompted one court to observe that "the burden that
liability [for negligent discharge] would impose on [employers] and

the community as a whole is unacceptably heavy." 6 Thus, in
considering the desirability of recognizing a duty to investigate
before discharging, it is useful to bear in mind what one court felt

"compelled" to note:
[A]ny substantial change in the "employ[ment]-at-will" rule
should first be microscopically analyzed regarding its effect on.
..commerce .... There must be protection from substantial
impairment of the very legitimate interests of an employer in
hiring and retaining the most qualified personnel available or the
very foundation of the free enterprise system could be jeopardized.m
In the face of these complex and often competing policy

considerations, courts are ordinarily reluctant to provide at-will
employees with the same job security that collective bargaining
agreements and legislative enactments often give to other employees,2 and therefore demonstrate little enthusiasm for imposing
upon employers a duty to investigate before discharging.

9

Instead, employers generally are given considerable discretion in
determining what personnel decisions would be best for their
20

businesses.

Underlying this "laissez-faire" attitude toward the employment

relationship29 appears to be a view that addressing issues of
employment security in the judicial process is a poor substitute for
doing so through collective bargaining 92 or the legislative pro-

and to the fact that "increased litigation and large recoveries inhibit the full
exercise of employer rights").
286. Wilson v. Vlasic Foods, Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2419, 2422 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
287. Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
288. See Price v. United Parcel Serv., 601 F. Supp. 20, 23 (D. Mass. 1984).
289. See Ferrett v. General Motors Corp., 475 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Mich. 1991).
290. LaGoe v. Duber Indus. Sec., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987), vacated, 782 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 1989); see also Blades, supra note 3, at 1428
("Compromise of the employer's power to make... judgments about professional,
managerial or other high-ranking employees ...

is especially undesirable. The

higher ranking the employee, the more important to the success of the business is
his effective performance.").
291. Crook, supra note 7, at 23; see also id. at 33 (referring to "the traditional
judicial reluctance to subject employers' legitimate business decisions to court
scrutiny").
292. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081,1086-87 (Wash. 1984).
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In Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,z 94 for

example, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to adopt the then
prevailing view in California that the implied covenant protects
employees from a termination without cause.2 95 In reaching that
conclusion, the court expressed its unwillingness to "establish[] by
judicial fiat the benefits that employees can and should get only
'
through collective bargaining agreements or tenure provisions."296
The court emphasized that it was not rejecting the propriety of such
a rule, but merely was convinced that its adoption should not be
"the result of judicial decision."2'
Much the same view underlies the decision of the Massachu298
setts Supreme Court in Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
In that case, the court observed that it had the authority to adopt
"a common law right of recovery for discharge without
cause

'

-with,

presumably, an accompanying duty to investigate

before disclarginga--premised upon the employer's obligation
of good faith and fair dealing and that a "forceful" argument could
be made for doing so. 30 1 The court nevertheless declined that

293. Id.; Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853,
858-59 (Minn. 1986); see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 397 (Cal.
1988):
Significant policy judgments affecting social policies and commercial
relationships are implicated in the.., employment termination context.
...[A] determination ...which has the potential to alter profoundly the
nature of employment, the cost of products and services, and the
availability of jobs, arguably is better suited for legislative decisionmaking.
294. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
295. Id. at 1040. California now appears to have repudiated that view as well.
See Foley, 765 P.2d at 400 n.39.
296. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1040.
297. Id.
298. 429 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1981).
299. Id. at 28; cf. Percell v. IBM, 765 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D.N.C. 1991)
("Because the employment at-will doctrine is a judicially adopted rule, it is the
province of the courts to delineate the scope of that rule."), affid, 23 F.3d 402 (4th
Cir. 1994).
300. See Ashway v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 375, 376
& n.2 (D. Ariz. 1989), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992).
301. Gram, 429 N.E.2d at 28.
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opportunity, noting that it was "within the authority of the
Legislature to enact such a rule."3°2
Not only has the Alaska Supreme Court indicated that it
agrees with the result reached in Gram, 3 but it appears to hold
the same view of the respective legislative and judicial roles.3"
As it recently stated in another context:
"It is the function of a legislature to shape law prospectively.
Besides being able to look forward, a legislature can establish.
. . policy in the context of other considerations, such as the

overall allocation of the state's resources. This legislative
function complements the appellate courts' review of individual
cases and synthesis of the individual decisions into a comprehen'30 5
sive set of interpretations of the statutes and constitution.
Because there appear to be no principled grounds upon which
courts can rely in choosing between the competing policies
implicated by the potential recognition of a duty to investigate
before discharging,0 6 the decision of whether to impose such a
duty should be made by the legislature, not the courts. 307 The
contrary argument likely to be made by advocates of judicial
reform-that a relative lack of political power on the part of
302. Id.
303. See Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Alaska
1986).
304. See, e.g., Industrial Indem. Co. v. State, 669 P.2d 561, 566 n.11 (Alaska

1983):
While we have remarked occasionally in the past upon the varied
elements of policy weighed by the legislature in reaching a ... decision,
we have done so only to illustrate the kinds of competing factors which
lie behind determinations of policy, and to demonstrate that the courts
are an inappropriate forum in which to re-evaluate those determinations.
305. State v. Wentz, 805 P.2d 962, 966-67 n.6 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Susanne
D. DiPietro, The Development of Appellate Sentencing Law in Alaska, 7 ALASKA
L. REV. 265, 296 (1990)).
306. See generally Young, supra note 3, at 217 n.105 (observing that "there is
no principled means by which courts can choose which public policy to implement
in a ...

contract dispute").

307. See Dancer v. State, 715 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) ("Policy
arguments ... must be addressed to the legislature, not the courts."); Concerned
Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452
(Alaska 1974) (observing that "the choice between competing notions of public
policy is to be made by elected representatives of the people"); see generally Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31 (Cal. 1988) ("Legislatures, in
making such policy decisions, have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit
the advice of experts, and hold hearings at which all interested parties may present
evidence and express their views.., addressing terms of discharge.").
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nonunion employees makes legislative action in this area unlikely3P° -is debatable. 3 9
Montana, for example, recently enacted legislation prohibiting
dismissal without cause,310 as did Puerto Rico 311 and the Virgin
Islands. 3 2 While they are, to date, the only jurisdictions to do
so,31 3 the legislatures of a number of other states have considered,
but not yet enacted, similar legislation.31 4 In addition, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has

308. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Wrongful Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 65,70 (1987) (observing that "non-union employee[s] will not be influential

unless the subject of wrongful discharge gains prominence in election politics"
because such employees are "poorly organized and largely ignorant of the legal
issues involved," and "there is no 'public interest' group that regularly speaks for
[them]"); Peck, supra note 15, at 43 (concluding that "legislatures are unlikely to
change the rule relating to employment for an indefinite term . . . [because]

unorganized employees ... do not constitute a lobby or an organized interest
group capable of exerting the pressure necessary to obtain legislative action");
Blades, supra note 3, at 1433-34 (concluding that "the prospects for any kind of
general legislative reform in this area are dim" because "[e]mployees having
diverse job specialties and working at varying echelons of employment simply are
not equipped to form a cohesive group with enough power to influence
legislators").
309. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1988) ("It
cannot be disputed that legislation at both the state and national level has
profoundly affected the scope of at-will terminations."); Perritt, supra note 308, at
65 ("Increasingly, legislatures are being asked to consider whether the law of
[wrongful] dismissal should be codified."); Martin, supra note 105, at 171
(observing that although "[ilt has been frequently suggested that legislatures will
not protect employees against unjust dismissal because no organized political
group would lobby for such legislation," employers also may have "an interest in
supporting wrongful termination legislation"); see also id. at 167 n.110 (observing
that "[s]tatutes protecting 'whistleblowers' from retaliatory discharge and
prohibiting employers from subjecting employees to a polygraph examination have
... been enacted in recent years" despite "similar political power concerns").
310. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1991).
311. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, § 185a-1 (1985).
312. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (Supp. 1989).
313. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 397 n.31; Henry, supra note 284, at 100.
314. See Perritt, supra note 308, at 73 (discussing legislative proposals in
California, Colorado, Michigan, New Jersey and Pennsylvania); Martin, supra note
105, at 171 & n.132 (discussing the California, Michigan, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania proposals, as well as one in Connecticut); Individual Empl. Rights
Man. (BNA) 540:26 (1991) ("There have been at least 14 states that have
undertaken to draft and/or consider legislation in this area.").
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promulgated a "Model Employment Termination Act, 315 patterned in many respects upon the Montana wrongful discharge
statute.16
At a minimum, these developments "should serve to increase
the prominence of wrongful discharge legislation as a political
topic 3 7 and "may help set the stage for the enactment of legislation of this kind in other states. 31 8 Indeed, the drafters of the
Model Act have predicted that "many more states" will consider
wrongful discharge legislation in the near future,3 9 and at least
one pair of commentators has concluded that "further enactment
32
of state legislation of this kind is inevitable."
To be sure, many state legislatures have been reluctant to
tamper with the employment-at-will rule,321 and Alaska itself
appears to have had no significant legislative activity affecting
private employment in more than a decade. 3' As one commentator observed, however, "states that have been inactive in the past
33
need not be inactive in the future.", 2
In any event, that one segment of the polity may have had
difficulty prevailing in the legislative arena is hardly a valid basis
for circumventing the democratic process in favor of judicial
policymaking. 324 Indeed, even some of the staunchest proponents
315. The text of the Model Act can be found, among other places, in BNA's
Individual Employment Rights Manual. Individual Empl. Rights Man. (BNA)

540:21 (1991).
316. See Leonard Bierman & Stuart A. Youngblood, Interpreting Montana's
PathbreakingWrongful Dischargefrom Employment Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis,
53 MONT.L. REV. 53 (1992) (observing that the Model Act "contains several

provisions modeled after the [Montana statute]").
317. Perritt, supra note 36, § 9.4, at 204.
318. Bierman & Youngblood, supra note 316, at 74.
319. Individual Empl. Rights Man. (BNA) 540:26 (1991).
320. Bierman & Youngblood, supra note 316, at 74 n.150 (citing Alan B.
Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States, 44
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 644, 658 (1991)).

321. See Henry, supra note 284, at 100 ("In some states ... there has been a
general unwillingness by the legislature to interfere with the at-will doctrine.").
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